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Abstract—Massive multiple-input multiple-output communi-
cations can achieve high-level security by concentrating radio
frequency signals towards the legitimate users. However, this
system is vulnerable in a Rician fading environment if the
eavesdropper positions itself such that its channel is highly
“similar” to the channel of a legitimate user. To address this
problem, this paper proposes an angle aware user cooperation
(AAUC) scheme, which avoids direct transmission to the attacked
user and relies on other users for cooperative relaying. The pro-
posed scheme only requires the eavesdropper’s angle information,
and adopts an angular secrecy model to represent the average
secrecy rate of the attacked system. With this angular model,
the AAUC problem turns out to be nonconvex, and a successive
convex optimization algorithm, which converges to a Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker solution, is proposed. Furthermore, a closed-form
solution and a Bregman first-order method are derived for the
cases of large-scale antennas and large-scale users, respectively.
Extension to the intelligent reflecting surfaces based scheme is
also discussed. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed successive convex optimization based AAUC
scheme, and also validate the low-complexity nature of the
proposed large-scale optimization algorithms.
Index Terms—Angle aware user cooperation, first-order
method, intelligent reflecting surfaces, massive MIMO, physical-
layer security, Rician fading.
I. INTRODUCTION
WHile 5G is expected to be commercially available in2020, it cannot fully satisfy the performance require-
ments of massive connectivity [1]. As a result, beyond 5G aims
to serve massive devices with lower latency, higher reliability,
and better security. Among the above metrics, security is
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considered as one of the most challenging problems in wireless
communications [2], and it is becoming even more imperative
in the era of big data [3], as the massive data usually
contains privacy messages such as personal information and
control signals. Traditionally, security is enforced by adopting
key encryption to prevent the eavesdropper from decoding
the message transmitted by legitimate users [4]. However,
it is shown by Wyner [5] that secure communication in the
presence of an eavesdropper can be guaranteed without any
key encryption, as long as the users’ channels are better than
the eavesdropper’s channel [5]–[8]. This is called physical-
layer security.
A. Motivation
In order to achieve the above channel condition for
physical-layer security, massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) communication is a promising technique, since mas-
sive MIMO can concentrate the radio frequency (RF) signals
towards the legitimate users while suppressing the RF power
leaked to the eavesdropper [9]–[14]. This leads to a situation
that the received signal power at the legitimate user is several
orders of magnitude larger than the received signal power at
the eavesdropper, thus enabling excellent security without any
extra effort [12]–[14]. However, there are still chances for
the eavesdropper to overhear the information via active and
passive attacks [12], [13]. In an active attack, the eavesdropper
adopts pilot contamination to interfere the channel estimation
procedure at the base station (BS) [15], misleading the BS to
transmit signals towards the eavesdropper. Such an attack has
been recently addressed by careful pilot designs [15]–[17].
Nonetheless, a passive attack is more difficult to deal with,
since the passive eavesdropper can hide itself and therefore
the BS would have very limited knowledge about the eaves-
dropper’s channel [18]–[21]. If the eavesdropper’s channel is
independent of users’ channels, massive MIMO with artificial
noise can be used to prevent eavesdropping [18]–[21]. But if
the system operates in a Rician fading environment (i.e., there
exists a line-of-sight (LoS) link [22]–[24]), the eavesdropper
can position itself such that its channel to the BS is highly
“similar” to the channel from a legitimate user to the BS [12,
Sec. IV-A], and this passive attack could pose great threats to
the massive MIMO system.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we propose an angle aware user cooperation
(AAUC) scheme to combat the above passive attack in massive
2MIMO systems. The proposed AAUC scheme avoids direct
transmission to the attacked user from BS and counts on other
users for cooperative relaying. Furthermore, in contrast to
existing works (e.g., [21]) that require full channel information
of the eavesdropper, our scheme only requires partial channel
information of the eavesdropper. In particular, the proposed
AAUC scheme exploits the information that the eavesdropper
wants to have a similar channel to that of a legitimate user,
for which its angle of departure would be similar to that of
the attacked user. Based on this angle awareness, the proposed
AAUC scheme automatically reduces the transmit powers of
users that are close to the potential eavesdropping region,
and an optimization problem is formulated to maximize the
average secrecy rate subject to the total power constraint.
Nonetheless, the formulated AAUC problem involves nu-
merical integration in the objective function. To circumvent
this obstacle, an angular secrecy model, which matches the
numerical integration very well, is proposed. Based on the
secrecy model, the numerical function is converted into an
analytical yet nonconvex function, and a successive convex
optimization (SCO) algorithm, which is guaranteed to con-
verge to a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) solution to the AAUC
problem, is derived. Furthermore, in the large-scale settings,
the closed-form solution and the Bregman first-order method
(BFOM) are proposed when the number of antennas and
the number of users are large, respectively. The two large-
scale methods reduce the computation time by orders of
magnitude compared to SCO based AAUC. Via integration
with intelligent reflecting surfaces (IRS), the power cost of
AAUC can be further reduced. Simulation results demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed SCO based AAUC, and
validate the low-complexity nature of the closed-form AAUC
and the BFOM based AAUC algorithms.
C. Outline
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. System
model and problem formulation are described in Section II and
Section III, respectively. The angular secrecy model and the
proposed SCO based AAUC scheme are presented in Section
IV. The large-scale optimization algorithms are derived in
Section V, and extension to the IRS based scheme is discussed
in Section VI. Finally, numerical results are presented in
Section VII, and conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
Notation: Italic letters, lowercase and uppercase bold letters
represent scalars, vectors, and matrices, respectively. The
operators Tr(·), (·)T , (·)H and (·)−1 take the trace, transpose,
Hermitian, and inverse of a matrix, respectively. The operator
[x]+ = max(x, 0). The symbol IN represents the N × N
identity matrix. The symbol CN (0, 1) represents complex
Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance, and
U(x, y) represents the uniform distribution within the interval
[x, y]. Finally, E(·) represents the expectation of a random
variable, and exp(·) represents the exponential function of a
scalar.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multicast system with LoS links, which
consists of a BS with N antennas,K single-antenna legitimate
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Fig. 1. System model of massive MIMO communication under the LoS attack.
users, and a single-antenna eavesdropper. As shown in Fig. 1,
the BS intends to multicast common information to the K
legitimate users, while the eavesdropper intends to overhear
the signal1. In particular, the eavesdropper hides at the line
segment between the BS and one of the users, denoted as
user K . In this way, the eavesdropper can receive a highly
correlated signal with that of user K [12], [13], thus decoding
the transmitted information. To address this problem, the
AAUC scheme consisting of two phases with equal duration
is proposed, and the details are given below.
A. Multicasting Phase
In the multicasting phase, the BS transmits a signal s with
E[|s|2] = 1 to users {1, 2, · · · ,K} through a transmit beam-
forming vector v ∈ CN×1 with power ||v||22. Accordingly, the
received signal at a legitimate user k is gHk vs + nk, where
gk ∈ CN×1 is the channel vector from the BS to the user k,
and nk ∈ C is the zero-mean Gaussian noise at the user k
with power σ2k. Denoting Dk and θk as the distance and the
azimuth angle (i.e., 0 means “north” and π/2 means “east”)
between BS and user k, the channel gk obeys the following
Rician fading [26], [27]:
gk =
√
̺0
(
Dk
d0
)−α(√
KR
1 +KR
gLOSk
+
√
1
1 +KR
gNLOSk
)
, k = 1, · · · ,K, (1)
where ̺0 is the pathloss at distance d0 = 1m, and α
is the pathloss exponent. Notice that KR is the Rician K-
factor accounting for propagation effects of the LoS and non-
LoS links, which can be pre-determined from a few channel
measurements in the environment [28]. Furthermore, the LoS
component gLOSk is [29]
gLOSk =
[
1, exp (−jπ sin θk) , · · · ,
1The detection of a passive attack is based on spectrum sensing [25].
3exp (−(N − 1) jπ sin θk)
]T
, (2)
and the non-LoS component gNLOSk ∼ CN (0, IN ).
Since the angle of eavesdropper θE can be approximated
as θE ≈ θK , gLOSE ≈ gLOSK holds, where gLOSE is the LoS
component of the channel gE ∈ CN×1 from the BS to the
eavesdropper. According to gLOSE ≈ gLOSK and (1), we have
gE//gK due to KR ≫ 1 in LoS environment, where a//b
means that vectors a and b have the same direction. To
ensure that |gHE v| = 0, the BS needs to design v such that
|gHKv| = 0. Therefore, the achievable rates at the user K and
the eavesdropper can be approximated to zero. On the other
hand, the achievable rate Rk at user k 6= K is
Rk =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|gHk v|2
σ2k
)
, ∀k 6= K, (3)
where the factor 1/2 is due to the two transmission phases.
B. User Cooperation Phase
Due to |gHKv| = 0, the user K would hardly receive
information during the multicasting phase. As a result, the
other users need to help to forward the information to user
K . In particular, the helping users {1, · · · ,K − 1} transmit
the signal s to the user K through a beamforming vector
w ∈ C(K−1)×1 = [w1, ..., wK−1]T in the user cooperation
phase, and the received signal at the user K is given by
hHKws + nK , where hK ∈ C(K−1)×1 is the channel vector2
from the helping users to the userK . Therefore, the achievable
rate RK at user K is [30]
RK =
1
2
min
{
R1, · · · , RK−1, log2
(
1 +
|hHKw|2
σ2K
)}
. (4)
On the other hand, the received signal at the eavesdropper is
given by hHEws+ nE , where hE ∈ C(K−1)×1 is the channel
vector from the helping users to the eavesdropper and nE ∈
C is the zero-mean Gaussian noise at the eavesdropper with
power σ2E . Accordingly, the eavesdropping rate is
3
RE =
1
2
min
{
R1, · · · , RK−1, log2
(
1 +
|hHEw|2
σ2E
)}
. (5)
Finally, combining the results in (3)–(5), the secrecy rate
of the multicast system under the AAUC scheme can be
expressed as [5]–[7]:[
min
k=1,··· ,K
Rk −RE
]+
=
[
R− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hHEw|2
σ2E
)]+
,
(6)
where the equality is due to RK ≤ Rk for any k 6= K
according to (4), and
R =
1
2
min
{
log2
(
1 +
|gH1 v|2
σ21
)
, · · · ,
log2
(
1 +
|gHK−1v|2
σ2K−1
)
, log2
(
1 +
|hHKw|2
σ2K
)}
. (7)
2Channel hK can be estimated at the user K , who subsequently forwards
hK to the BS.
3In practice, the eavesdropper may not know w. However, the eavesdropper
can adjust its receiver to fully exploit the received signal strength |hH
E
w|2.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Average Secrecy Rate
The major challenge to maximize (6) is that hE is unknown.
A traditional way is to model hE as a constant value ĥE
plus some random perturbations [21], [31]. However, such
a method requires the knowledge of ĥE , which is difficult
to obtain since the eavesdropper is passive. To combat the
passive attack without knowing the full channel information,
we propose to exploit the angular information. In particular,
denoting the location of BS as (0, 0), the location of user k can
be expressed as (Dk cos θk, Dk sin θk), where Dk cos θk is the
latitude and Dk sin θk is the longitude. Since the eavesdropper
hides at the line segment between BS and user K , the location
of eavesdropper can be represented as (ρ cos θK , ρ sin θK),
where ρ is bounded from 0 to DK .
Based on the locations, the distance from user k to eaves-
dropper is given by
dE,k(ρ) =
[
(ρ cos θK −Dk cos θk)2
+ (ρ sin θK −Dk sin θk)2
]−1/2
. (8)
By further adopting the Rician fading channel model [26],
[27], the channel hE,k (which is the k
th element in hE =
[hE,1, · · · , hE,K−1]T ) from user k to eavesdropper can be
modeled as:
hE,k(ρ, φk, δk) =
√
̺0
(
dE,k(ρ)
d0
)−α
×
(√
KR
1 +KR
ejφk +
√
1
1 +KR
δk
)
, (9)
where φk is the phase
4 of LoS link with φk ∼ U(−π,+π),
and δk is the non-LoS component with δk ∼ CN (0, 1).
By substituting the channel model (9) into (6), the secrecy
rate for a fixed (ρ, {φk, δk}) can be obtained. Then by aver-
aging the result in (6) over (ρ, {φk, δk}), the average secrecy
rate of the system can be computed as follows [32]–[34]:
S(R,w|σE) = 1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
{[
R
− 1
2
log2
1 +
∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2
σ2E
]+} dρ. (10)
B. Secrecy Rate Maximization
In the considered system, the design variables that can be
controlled are the transmit beamformer v at BS and the dis-
tributed beamformerw at helping users. Since the power costs
at both BS and helping users should be smaller than the total
budget, the beamformers need to satisfy
||v||2
2 +
||w||2
2 ≤ Pmax,
where the factor 1/2 is due to the two transmission phases,
and Pmax is the total transmit power budget. Having the
transmit power satisfied, it is then crucial to maximize the
4Since each user has its own local phase shift in the transmitted signal, φk
is a random value independent of ρ.
4average secrecy rate S(R,w|σE), which leads to the following
optimization problem:
P1 : max
v,w,R
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
{[
R− 1
2
log2
(
1
+
∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2
σ2E
)]+}
dρ,
s.t.
||v||22
2
+
||w||22
2
≤ Pmax, (11a)
|gHKv| = 0, (11b)
R ≤ 1
2
log2
(
1 +
|gHk v|2
σ2k
)
, ∀k 6= K, (11c)
R ≤ 1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hHKw|2
σ2K
)
, (11d)
where the objective function of P1 is obtained from (10).
The constraint (11a) is the operation budget constraint and
the constraint (11b) guarantees that no information is leaked
to the eavesdropper during the multicasting phase. Finally,
the constraints (11c) and (11d) are the data-rate constraints
obtained from (7).
Notice that problem P1 can be extended to the case with
different information signals for different users by adding
an additional individual transmission phase for the users
{1, · · · ,K − 1}. In addition, the problem P1 can be extended
to the case with separate transmit power constraints at BS
and users. In such a case, the design variables v and w are no
longer coupled in the constraints, and the proposed algorithms
are still applicable to the resultant problem.
IV. PROPOSED SCO BASED AAUC
A. Angular Secrecy Model
To solve P1, the first challenge comes from the integration
over ρ and the expectation over {φk, δk}, which make the
objective a numerical function ofw. To address this challenge,
it is observed from (10) that the secrecy rate S satisfies the
following properties:
(i) When σ2E → 0, we must have S → 0.
(ii) When σ2E → +∞, the secrecy rate S would reach its
maximum value R.
(iii) The secrecy rate S is lower bounded by a logarithm
function
[
R− 12 log2
(
1 +wHJw/σ2E
)]+
(proved in Ap-
pendix A), where J = diag (J1, · · · , JK−1) is the angu-
lar matrix with
Jk =
̺0
Dk
∫ DK
0
[
(ρ cos θK −Dk cos θk)2
+ (ρ sin θK −Dk sin θk)2
]−α/2
dρ. (12)
Based on (i)–(iii), the average secrecy rate should have a
logarithm curve with respect to noise power σ2E . To this end,
we propose an angular secrecy model as follows:
Ŝ (R,w|σE , λ) =
[
R− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λwHJw
σ2E
)]+
, (13)
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Fig. 2. a) Illustrating example with K = 3, α = 2.5 and KR = 30 dB; b)
Fitting performance of the angular secrecy model.
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a tuning parameter. It can be verified that
the nonlinear function in (13) satisfies all the properties (i)–
(iii). Moreover, since equation (12) does not involve w inside
the integral, the angular matrix J can be computed via one-
dimensional integration.
Interpretation of the Angular Matrix. Jk in (12) is
the average pathloss from user k to the eavesdropper and
quantitatively measures how dangerous for user k to transmit
a signal. For example, in Fig. 2a with K = 3 and α = 2.5, we
have J1 = 10
−5̺0 and J2 = 2 × 10−6̺0 according to (12),
meaning that user 2 can provide much better security. This
corroborates the fact that user 1 is closer to the line segment
between BS and user 3.
Based on (i)–(iii), Ŝλ (R,w|σE , λ) would have a similar
trend to S, and the next step is to minimize the gap between
the two curves Ŝ (R,w|σE , λ) and S (R,w|σE). Since Ŝ
is a decreasing function of λ, one-dimensional search over
[0, 1] can be adopted to determine an appropriate λ. More
specifically, we numerically compute S(R(i),w(i)|σ(i)E ) using
(10) for the input (R(i),w(i), σ
(i)
E ), where i = 1, · · · , T is the
index of training sample and T is the sample size. With the
training set {(R(i),w(i), σ(i)E )}Ti=1, the parameter λ in Ŝ can
be found via nonlinear least squares fitting:
min
λ∈[0,1]
1
T
T∑
i=1
∣∣∣S(R(i),w(i)|σ(i)E )− Ŝ (R(i),w(i)|σ(i)E , λ) ∣∣∣2.
(14)
In order to verify the accuracy of the model, we consider the
setting of Fig. 2a. In this environment, we consider 41 different
5values of [σ
(i)
E ]
2 ranging from −100 dBm to −60 dBm by a
step size of 2 dBm, and T = 21 × 100 training samples are
generated with R(i) ∼ U(0, 3) and w(i) ∼ CN (0, 0.01K−1 IK−1)
(i.e., the average power ofw(i) is 10 dBm). It can be seen from
Fig. 2b that with the choice of λ = 0.64, the proposed model
matches the numerical simulation of S very well under a large
range of noise power σ2E . Moreover, the mean square error of
(14) at λ = 0.64 is 0.0056, which is negligible compared to
the absolute secrecy rate.
Remark 1: Notice that the proposed method can be well
extended to the 3D scenarios when the eavesdropper is not on
the same plane as the users (e.g., the eavesdropper is a flying
unmanned aerial vehicle [35]). In such a case, the distance
from eavesdropper to the user k is
dE,k(ρ) =
[
(ρ cos θK −Dk cos θk)2
+ (ρ sin θK −Dk sin θk)2 + ρ2 tan2 β
]−1/2
, (15)
where β is the elevation angle of the eavesdropper. Accord-
ingly, the kth element of the angular matrix becomes
Jk =
̺0
DK
∫ DK
0
[
(ρ cos θK −Dk cos θk)2
+ (ρ sin θK −Dk sin θk)2 + ρ2 tan2 β
]−α/2
dρ. (16)
Once the angular matrix is defined, all the derivations in the
manuscript stay the same for 2D and 3D scenarios.
B. Proposed SCO Algorithm
With the angular secrecy model, we can replace
S(R,w|σE) with Ŝ(R,w|σE , λ) in the objective function of
P1, and the resultant problem is given by
max
v,w,R
Ŝ (R,w|σE , λ) s.t. (11a)− (11d). (17)
To solve (17), the following transformations are used to
eliminate the constraints.
• QR decomposition is applied to gK , and the unitary
matrix U ∈ CN×(N−1), which spans the null space of
gK , is obtained. With U, we can set v = Uz, where
z ∈ C(N−1)×1 is a newly introduced variable.
• Putting v = Uz into (11a), this constraint becomes
||z||22+ ||w||22 ≤ 2Pmax, where we have used UHU = I.
• Putting v = Uz into (11b), we have |gHKUz| = 0. This
constraint is always feasible due to gHKU = 0
T .
• Putting (11c) and (11d) into the objective function of (17),
the inequality constraints (11c)–(11d) can be removed.
Based on the above procedure, problem (17) is equivalently
reformulated into
P2 : max
z,w
min
[
min
k 6=K
Φk(z,w),Υ(w)
]
,
s.t. ||z||22 + ||w||22 ≤ 2Pmax, (18)
where
Φk(z,w) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λwHJw
σ2E
)
, (19)
Υ(w) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|hHKw|2
σ2K
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λwHJw
σ2E
)
. (20)
Due to the non-concave functions Φk and Υ, problem P2
is nonconvex. To address this nonconvexity, we will propose
a successive convex optimization (SCO) algorithm [36]–[41],
which constructs a sequence of lower bounds on {Φk,Υ} and
solves the surrogate problems. There are many techniques to
construct the surrogate functions, e.g., convexity inequality,
second-order Taylor expansion, arithmetic-geometric mean
inequality, and Cauchy-Schwartz inequality [36]. In this pa-
per, the surrogate functions are found by first-order Taylor
expansion.
More specifically, given any feasible solution (z⋆,w⋆) to
P2, we define surrogate functions
Φ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 + 2Re
[
(z⋆)HUHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k
]
− |g
H
k Uz
⋆|2
σ2k
)
− λw
HJw − λ (w⋆)H Jw⋆
2ln2
[
σ2E + λ (w
⋆)H Jw⋆
]
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λ (w⋆)H Jw⋆
σ2E
)
, (21)
Υ˜(w|w⋆)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 + 2Re
[
(w⋆)HhKh
H
Kw
σ2K
]
− |h
H
Kw
⋆|2
σ2K
)
− λw
HJw − λ (w⋆)H Jw⋆
2ln2
[
σ2E + λ (w
⋆)
H
Jw⋆
]
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λ (w⋆)
H
Jw⋆
σ2E
)
, (22)
and the following proposition can be established.
Proposition 1. The functions {Φ˜k, Υ˜} satisfy the fol-
lowing properties: (i) Φ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆) ≤ Φk(z,w) and
Υ˜(w|w⋆) ≤ Υ(w); (ii) Φ˜k(z⋆,w⋆|z⋆,w⋆) = Φk(z⋆,w⋆)
and Υ˜(w⋆|w⋆) = Υ(w⋆); (iii) With complex gradient op-
erator ∇x := ∂/∂ conj(x),
∇zΦ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆)
∣∣∣
z=z⋆,w=w⋆
=∇zΦk(z,w)
∣∣∣
z=z⋆,w=w⋆
,
∇wΦ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆)
∣∣∣
z=z⋆,w=w⋆
=∇wΦk(z,w)
∣∣∣
z=z⋆,w=w⋆
,
∇wΥ˜(w|w⋆)
∣∣∣
w=w⋆
=∇wΥ(w)
∣∣∣
w=w⋆
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
With the above observation, a lower bound can be directly
obtained if we replace the functions {Φk,Υ} by {Φ˜k, Υ˜}
expanded around a feasible point. However, a tighter lower
bound can be achieved if we treat the obtained solution as
another feasible point and continue to construct the next-round
6surrogate function. In particular, assuming that the solution at
the nth iteration is given by (z[n],w[n]), the proposed SCO
executes the following two steps at the (n+ 1)th iteration:
• Use CVX Mosek [42], a Matlab software package for
convex optimization, to solve
P2[n+ 1] : max
z,w
min
[
min
k 6=K
Φ˜k(z,w|z[n],w[n]),
Υ˜(w|w[n])
]
,
s.t. ||z||22 + ||w||22 ≤ 2Pmax. (23)
• Denoting the optimal solution to P2[n+ 1] as (z∗,w∗),
we set (z[n+1],w[n+1]) = (z∗,w∗), and the process
repeats with solving the problem P2[n+ 2].
According to Proposition 1 and [36, Theorem 1], the
sequence {(z[0],w[0]), (z[1],w[1]), · · · } converges to the KKT
solution to P2 for any feasible starting point (z[0],w[0]). In
terms of computational complexity, P2[n + 1] involves N +
K−2 variables, and the complexity for solving P2[n+1] can
be computed to be O[(N+K−2)3.5] [43]. As a consequence,
the total complexity for solving P2 is O[I(N +K − 2)3.5],
where I is the number of iterations needed for the SCO based
AUCC algorithm to converge.
V. LARGE-SCALE OPTIMIZATION ALGORITHMS
While a KKT solution to P2 has been obtained in Section
IV, the corresponding SCO algorithm requires a cubic com-
plexity with respect to N and K . This leads to extremely
time-consuming computations in the case of large N or
K . Therefore, efficient large-scale optimization algorithms
become indispensable. Below, we will sequentially consider
the cases of large N , large K and large (N,K).
A. Large Number of Antennas
When N is very large such that N ≫ K , the channels
from BS to users would be approximately orthogonal and
we have |gHj gk|2/||gk||22 → 0 for any j 6= k [9]. Based
on such orthogonal feature, the following proposition can be
established.
Proposition 2. The asymptotic optimal z∗ and w∗ to P2 when
N → +∞ satisfy
z∗ =
K−1∑
k=1
√
(2Pmax − ||w∗||22)σ2k∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
UHgk
||UHgk||22
. (24)
Proof. See Appendix C.
Using the result from Proposition 2, we can eliminate the
vector z in P2 by setting z = z∗, which would not change the
optimal objective value of P2. After the above procedure, Φk
in the objective function becomes
Φ1(z
∗,w) = · · · =ΦK−1(z∗,w) = Ψ(w),
where
Ψ(w) =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
2Pmax − ||w||22∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
)
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λwHJw
σ2E
)
. (25)
Moreover, since the constraint (18) is always satisfied by z in
(24), it can be removed accordingly.
Based on the above transformation, problem P2 underN →
+∞ is equivalent to
P3 : max
w
min [Ψ(w),Υ(w)] . (26)
Now, it can be seen that problem P3 only involves one variable
w, and is of much lower dimension than P2. Although P3 is a
nonconvex problem, the following proposition is established,
which derives the closed-form solution of w.
Proposition 3. The optimal w∗ to P3 is
w∗ =
(
Ξ+ λJ/σ2E
)−1/2
q√
qH (Ξ+ λJ/σ2E)
−1/2
Ξ (Ξ+ λJ/σ2E)
−1/2
q
,
(27)
where
Ξ =
1
2Pmax
[
hKh
H
K
σ2K
(
K−1∑
i=1
σ2i
||UHgi||22
)
+ I
]
, (28)
and q is the dominant eigenvector of(
Ξ+ λJ/σ2E
)−1/2 (
Ξ+ hKh
H
K/σ
2
K
) (
Ξ + λJ/σ2E
)−1/2
.
Proof. See Appendix D.
Since P3 is equivalent to P2 under N →∞, the asymptotic
optimal w∗ to P2 is given by (27) according to Proposition
3. By putting w = w∗ into (24) of Proposition 2, the optimal
z∗ to P2 under N →∞ is also obtained. Therefore, the entire
procedure for deriving the solution to P2 with large N is to
execute (27) and (24) sequentially. The computational com-
plexity of the closed-form AAUC algorithm is dominated by
computing
(
Ξ+ λJ/σ2E
)−1/2
, which requires a complexity of
O((K − 1)3).
B. Large Number of Users
When K is very large, the orthogonal condition does not
hold and the closed-form AAUC scheme is not applicable. To
this end, this subsection will propose the BFOM based AAUC
scheme for solving P2 when K is large.
More specifically, as K → +∞, ||hK ||22 ≫ Tr(J) holds.
Therefore, we have Υ(w) → 12 log2
(
1 + |hHKw|2/σ2K
)
, and
the optimal w∗ is given by w∗ =
√
phK/||hK ||2, with p ≥ 0
being the transmit power to be determined. By putting w =√
phK/||hK ||2 into P2, P2 under K → +∞ is re-written as
P4 : max
z, p≥0
min
(
min
k=1,...,K−1
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
,
p||hK ||22
σ2K
)
,
s.t. ||z||22 + p ≤ 2Pmax, (29)
where we have removed 12 log2(1+ ·) in the objective function
due to its monotonicity. It can be seen from P4 that the
objective function to be maximized is non-concave. Therefore,
P4 is a nonconvex optimization problem, which can also be
solved via the SCO algorithm. Specifically, with any feasible
7starting point (z[0], p[0]), we execute the following update at
the nth iteration:(
z[n+1], p[n+1]
)
= argmax
z, p≥0
||z||22+p≤2Pmax
min
{
min
k=1,...,K−1
(
2Re
[
(z[n])HUHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k
)
− |g
H
k Uz
[n]|2
σ2k
)
,
p||hK ||22
σ2K
}
,
(30)
According to [36]–[41], the above iterative procedure is guar-
anteed to converge to a KKT solution to P4.
Based on the SCO framework, the remaining question is
how to compute (30). The major challenge comes from the
non-smooth operator mink=1,...,K−1 in the objective function,
which hinders us from computing the gradients. To this end, in
the following, problem (30) will be reformulated into a smooth
bilevel optimization problem with ℓ1 norm and ℓ2 norm
constraints. Furthermore, since the projection onto ℓ1 norm
in Euclidean space involves a high computational complexity,
we propose to execute the projection in non-Euclidean space.
This is achieved by using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
as the distance measure, and the resultant algorithm is termed
BFOM based AAUC.
First of all, we derive the procedure that equivalently
transforms (30) into a smooth optimization problem. To this
end, variables x = [Re(zT ), Im(zT )]T ∈ R(2N−2)×1 and
γ ∈ RK×1 are introduced with x ∈ A and γ ∈ B, where
A ={x : ||x||22 ≤ 2Pmax} ,
B ={γ ∈ RK×1+ : ||γ||1 = 1}. (31)
Then (30) is equivalent to
P5 : max
x∈A
min
γ∈B
Θ[n] (x,γ) , (32)
where
Θ[n] (x,γ) =
K−1∑
k=1
γk
(
(r
[n]
k )
Tx+ t
[n]
k
)
,
+
γK ||hK ||22
(
2Pmax − ||x||22
)
σ2K
,
r
[n]
k =
2
σ2k
[
Re
(
UHgkg
H
k Uz
[n]
)
Im
(
UHgkg
H
k Uz
[n]
) ] , ∀k 6= K,
t
[n]
k = −
|gHk Uz[n]|2
σ2k
, ∀k 6= K. (33)
Now, it can be seen from P5 that Θ[n](x,γ) is differentiable
in both x and γ. Moreover, Θ[n] is a bilevel function of two
variables, with the upper layer variable x constrained by ℓ2
norm and the lower layer variable γ constrained by ℓ1 norm.
To address this bilevel problem, the proposed BFOM starts
from a feasible x = y[0] ∈ A and γ = η[0] ∈ B (e.g., y[0] = 0
and η[0] = 1K/K), and solves P5 via the following update
at the (m+ 1)th iteration [44]:
y⋄ = argmin
x∈A
WA
(
x,y[m]
)
− 1
2L
xT∇xΘ[n] (x,γ) |x=y[m],γ=η[m] , (34a)
η⋄ = argmin
γ∈B
WB
(
γ,η[m]
)
+
1
2L
γT∇γΘ[n] (x,γ) |x=y[m],γ=η[m] , (34b)
y[m+1] = argmin
x∈A
WA
(
x,y[m]
)
− 1
2L
xT∇xΘ[n] (x,γ) |x=y⋄,γ=η⋄ , (34c)
η[m+1] = argmin
γ∈B
WB
(
γ,η[m]
)
+
1
2L
γT∇γΘ[n] (x,γ) |x=y⋄,γ=η⋄ , (34d)
where WA is the Euclidean distance induced by ℓ2 norm and
WB is the KL divergence induced by ℓ1 norm:
WA
(
x,y[m]
)
=
1
2
||x− y[m]||22, (35)
WB
(
γ,η[m]
)
=
K∑
k=1
γk ln
(
γk
η
[m]
k
)
. (36)
Furthermore, the gradients ∇xΘ[n] and ∇γΘ[n] are given by
∇xΘ[n] (x,γ) =
K−1∑
k=1
γkr
[n]
k −
2γK ||hK ||22 x
σ2K
, (37a)
∇γΘ[n] (x,γ) =
[
(r
[n]
1 )
Tx+ t
[n]
1 , · · · , (r[n]K−1)Tx+ t[n]K−1,
||hK ||22
(
2Pmax − ||x||22
) /
σ2K
]T
. (37b)
Finally, L is the Bregman Lipschitz constant satisfying
||∇xΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇xΘ[n] (x′,γ) ||2 ≤ L||x− x′||2, (38a)
||∇xΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇xΘ[n] (x,γ′) ||2 ≤ L||γ − γ′||1, (38b)
||∇γΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇γΘ[n] (x,γ′) ||∞ ≤ L||γ − γ′||1, (38c)
||∇γΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇γΘ[n] (x′,γ) ||∞ ≤ L||x− x′||2, (38d)
∀x,x′ ∈ A, ∀γ,γ′ ∈ B.
The following proposition derives a valid L satisfying the
above conditions.
Proposition 4. The conditions (38a)–(38d) are satisfied with
L = L̂, where
L̂ =max
[
||r[n]1 ||2, · · · , ||r[n]K−1||2,
2||hK ||22max
(√
2Pmax, 1
)/
σ2K
]
. (39)
Proof. See Appendix E.
Although L̂ is a valid Lipschiz constant according to Propo-
sition 4, whether a smaller L with L < L̂ would satisfy (38a)–
(38d) is not known. Thus, in practice we need to fine-tune the
hyper-parameter L and this paper sets L = L̂/K .
The key idea of (34a)–(34d) is to update the variables
along their gradient direction, while keeping the updated
point {y⋄,η⋄,y[m+1],η[m+1]} close to the current point
{y[m],η[m]}. Furthermore, by using the intermediate point
{y⋄,η⋄} in (34a)–(34b), we can compute the look-ahead
gradient for updating {y[m+1],η[m+1]} as in (34c)–(34d). As
proved in [44]–[47], the iterative procedure (34a)–(34d) is
8guaranteed to converge to the optimal solution to P5 with
a convergence rate of O(1/m).
Notice that the KKT optimality conditions can be adopted
to derive the closed-form expressions for (34a)–(34d). In
particular, equations (34a)–(34b) are equivalent to
y⋄ =
(
max
[∣∣∣∣∣∣y[m] + ∇xΘ[n] (y[m],η[m])
2L
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
,
√
2Pmax
])−1
×
√
2Pmax
[
y[m] +
∇xΘ[n]
(
y[m],η[m]
)
2L
]
,
η⋄k =
(
K∑
i=1
η
[m]
i exp
[
−∇γiΘ
[n]
(
y[m],η[m]
)
2L
])−1
× η[m]k exp
[
−∇γkΘ
[n]
(
y[m],η[m]
)
2L
]
, ∀k.
On the other hand, the closed-form expressions for (34c)–(34d)
can be derived similarly. In terms of computational complexity,
the total complexity of the BFOM based AAUC would be
O(IMKN), where I and M are the number of iterations
for the SCO and BFOM algorithms, respectively.
Remark 2: Since our aim is to obtain an approximate solu-
tion, we can terminate the iterative procedure when the norm
||y[m+1] − y[m]|| is small enough, e.g., ||y[m] − y[m−1]|| <
10−4, or the number of iterations reaches 3000. Then, the
optimal x∗ to P5 is given by x∗ =
√
τ y[m]/||y[m]||2, where
τ solves
min
k=1,··· ,K−1
√
τ (r
[n]
k )
Ty[m]
||y[m]||2 + t
[n]
k =
||hK ||22 (2Pmax − τ)
σ2K
.
(41)
Accordingly, the optimal z∗ and p∗ to problem (30) can be
recovered as z∗ = [x∗1, · · · , x∗N−1]T+j [x∗N , · · · , x∗2N−2]T and
p∗ = 2Pmax − ||z∗||22.
C. Large Number of Antennas and Users
When bothN andK are very large (withN/K being a large
constant), we can combine the derivations in Sections V-A and
V-B. More specifically, based on |gHj gk|2/||gk||22 → 0 for
j 6= k when N → ∞ and Υ(w)→ 12 log2
(
1 + |hHKw|2/σ2K
)
when K →∞, the problem P2 under N,K →∞ is
P6 : max
p
min
[
1
2
log2
(
1 +
2Pmax − p∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
)
,
1
2
log2
(
1 +
p||hK ||22
σ2K
)]
,
where p is the users’ total power to be determined. In the ob-
jective function, the first term inside the minimum function is
monotonic decreasing in p while the second term is monotonic
increasing in p. Therefore, the optimal p∗ to P6 must satisfy
1
2
log2
(
1 +
(2Pmax − p)∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
)
=
1
2
log2
(
1 +
p||hK ||22
σ2K
)
, (42)
which gives
p∗ =
2Pmax
1 +
||hK ||22
σ2K
(∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
) . (43)
As a result, the optimal w∗ to P2 when K and N go to
infinity can be recovered as w∗ =
√
p∗hK/||hK ||2. With w∗,
the optimal z∗ can be computed using Proposition 2.
VI. IRS BASED SCHEME
It can be seen from problem P1 that the proposed AAUC
scheme requires extra power consumption from other devices.
To avoid extra power consumption, the proposed scheme can
be integrated with the emerging technology of intelligent
reflecting surfaces (IRS) [48]–[51]. In particular, we can place
the IRS elements at the users k = 1, · · · ,K − 1 (for fair
comparison with the non-IRS case). Then each element of the
IRS receives the multi-path signals from the BS, and scatters
the combined signal with adjustable amplitude and phase to
userK . By employing the IRS technique, the two transmission
phases can be combined into one, and the system cost of the
proposed scheme can be significantly reduced.
More specifically, the optimization problem of the IRS
based scheme is given by
Q1 : max
v,u,R
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
{[
R− log2
(
1 +
1
σ2E∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})([g1, · · · ,gK−1]H v ◦ u) ∣∣∣2
)]+}
dρ,
s.t. ||v||22 ≤ Pmax, |gHKv| = 0, (44a)
R ≤ log2
(
1 +
|gHk v|2
σ2k
)
, ∀k 6= K, (44b)
R ≤ log2
(
1 +
∣∣∣hHK ([g1, · · · ,gK−1]H v ◦ u) ∣∣∣2
σ2K
)
,
(44c)
|uk|2 ≤ 1, ∀k 6= K, (44d)
where u ∈ C(K−1)×1 is the amplitude and phase design at
IRS. By introducing a slack variable c = [g1, · · · ,gK−1]H v◦
u ∈ C(K−1)×1 with |ck|2 ≤ |gHk v|2, and adopting the angular
secrecy model in (13), the problem Q1 is converted into
Q2 : max
v,c,R
[
R− log2
(
1 +
λcHJc
σ2E
)]+
,
s.t. ||v||22 ≤ Pmax, |gHKv| = 0, (45a)
R ≤ log2
(
1 +
|gHk v|2
σ2k
)
, ∀k 6= K, (45b)
R ≤ log2
(
1 +
|hHKc|2
σ2K
)
, (45c)
|ck|2 ≤ |gHk v|2, ∀k 6= K, (45d)
The above problem has a similar structure as P1 and can
be solved by the SCO algorithm. Notice that the channel
estimation of the IRS based scheme is challenging due to the
low costs of IRS elements. Therefore, IRS is not applicable
to the case of fast changing channels.
9VII. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section provides simulation results to evaluate the
performance of the proposed scheme. It is assumed that
the noise powers σ21 = · · · = σ2K = σ2E = −80 dBm
[48] (corresponding to power spectral density −140 dBm/Hz
[52] with 1MHz bandwidth). The transmit power budget is
Pmax = 30 dBm and the pathloss exponent is set to α = 2.5.
The pathloss at the distance of 1m is −40 dB, which is
computed using the 3GPP UMi model [53] and 3.5GHz
carrier frequency (i.e., carrier frequency of 5G in China). We
adopt λ = 0.64 for the secrecy model in (13), and the number
of iterations for SCO is set to I = 20.
Based on the above settings, we simulate the following
massive MIMO system:
• The BS is located at (0, 0).
• The users are located at (Dk cos θk, Dk sin θk) with
Dk ∼ U(100, 500) and θk ∼ U(−π, π) for all k.
• The eavesdropper is located at (DE cos θK , DE sin θK)
with DE ∼ U(0, DK).
• All the distances use the unit of m.
With {Dk, θk, DE, θE}, channels {gk,gE} are generated
according to (1). The channel hE is generated according to
(9), where the distance dE,k between the eavesdropper and the
user k is computed based on their locations. The channel hK
is also generated according to (9), but with dE,k replaced by
the distance dK,k between the users K and k. Finally, each
point in the figures is obtained by averaging over 50 simulation
runs, with independent channel realizations and locations of
users in each run.
A. Evaluation of SCO Based AAUC
In order to verify the performance of the proposed SCO
based AAUC, the case of K = 10 with N = 100 is simulated,
and the average secrecy rate versus Rician K-factor KR ∈
{0, 10, 20, 40} in dB is shown in Fig. 3a. Besides the proposed
AAUC, we also simulate the direct transmission scheme. For
direct transmission, the multicasting beamforming design v is
obtained by the conic quadratic programming approach [54].
It can be seen from Fig. 3a that when KR is very small, it is
still possible to achieve a positive secrecy rate for the direct
transmission scheme, since the channels {gK ,gE} are not
exactly in the same direction due to the non-LOS components.
However, as KR increases, the direct transmission scheme
would lead to zero secrecy rates, since the channels gK and gE
are highly correlated. This result corroborates our discussions
in Section I that the direct transmission is vulnerable to the
eavesdropping in Rician fading environment. Fortunately, by
adopting user cooperation, all the AAUC schemes significantly
outperform the direct transmission scheme. Furthermore, no
matter what value KR takes, the proposed SCO based AAUC
always outperforms the closed-form AAUC and the BFOM
based AAUC. This is because SCO based AAUC does not
rely on the assumption of large number of antennas or users.
Notice that the secrecy rate of SCO based AAUC increases as
KR increases. This is because |gHKv| = 0 is adopted in P1,
and a higher correlation between gK and gE means a smaller
|gHE v|2 at the eavesdropper.
B. Evaluation of Large-Scale Optimization Algorithms
Next, to verify the performance and the low complexity
nature of closed-form AAUC when N is large, the case
of K = 20 with KR = 30 dB is simulated, and the
average secrecy rate versus the number of antennas N ∈
{20, 100, 200, 500} is shown in Fig. 3b. It can be seen that
when N is small (e.g., N = 20), the performance gap
between SCO based AAUC and closed-form AAUC is large.
This is because the channels {gk} are not orthogonal for a
small N , which deviates from the orthogonality assumption
adopted in the closed-form AAUC. However, as N increases,
the performance of closed-form AAUC is approaching that
of SCO based AAUC. This corroborates Proposition 2 and
Proposition 3 derived in Section V-A. On the other hand,
Fig. 4a shows the average execution time versus the number
of antennas at the BS. Compared to SCO based AAUC, closed-
form AAUC saves the computation times by several orders of
magnitude for all the simulated values of N , revealing the
low-complexity nature of the proposed closed-form solution.
To analyze the performance and the complexity of BFOM
based AAUC when K is large, the case of N = 100 with
KR = 30 dB is simulated, and the average secrecy rate versus
the number of users K ∈ {10, 20, 50, 100} is shown in Fig.
3c. It can be seen that closed-form AAUC performs poorly
in this setting since a large K would lead to nonorthogonal
channels of {gk}. In contrast, BFOM based AAUC achieves
a satisfactory secrecy rate. Moreover, the performance gap be-
tween BFOM based AAUC and SCO based AAUC decreases
as K increases, which corroborates the discussions in Section
V-B. On the other hand, as shown in Fig. 4b, BFOM based
AAUC saves at least 90% (one order of magnitude) of the
computation time compared with SCO based AAUC. Its flat
curve of execution time reveals the linear complexity nature
of the proposed BFOM algorithm.
C. Evaluation of IRS Based Scheme
Now, to evaluate the performance of the proposed IRS based
scheme, we simulate the case of N = 100 and K = 10 with
KR = 70 dB. The average secrecy rate versus the distance
Dk = D1 = D2 = · · · = D10 is shown in Fig. 4c. It can
be seen from Fig. 4c that the proposed IRS based scheme
outperforms the proposed SCO based AAUC when Dk = 20
due to the smaller number of transmission phases with IRS.
However, the IRS based scheme performs worse than the
proposed SCO based AAUC when Dk = 60. This is because
the power of the scattered signal from IRS cannot exceed the
received signal power at IRS as seen from (44d). As a result,
when the IRS elements are far from the BS, the scattered signal
from IRS is weak. In contrast, the helping users in the SCO
based AAUC scheme can use a much larger transmit power
than its received signal power.
D. Rayleigh Fading Channel
Finally, to demonstrate the versatility of the proposed
method, we simulate a case of non-Rician fading channel
and the eavesdropper is not in the same angle as one of
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Fig. 3. a) Average secrecy rate versus Rician K-factor KR when K = 10 and N = 100; b) Average secrecy rate versus the number of antennas N when
K = 20 and KR = 30 dB; c) Average secrecy rate versus the number of users K when N = 100 and KR = 30dB.
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Fig. 4. a) Average execution time versus the number of antennas N ; b) Average execution time versus the number of users K; c) Average secrecy rate versus
the distance Dk when N = 100 and K = 10.
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Fig. 5. a) Average secrecy rate in Rayleigh fading channels with eavesdropper not in the same angle as one of the users; b) A realization of locations of BS,
users, and eavesdropper when K = 100; c) A realization of locations of BS, users, and eavesdropper when K = 20.
the users. In particular, we consider the case of N = 100
and KR = 0 (i.e., Rayleigh fading). The eavesdropper is
randomly located at (DE cos θE , DE sin θE) with DE ∼
U(100, 500) and θE ∼ U(−π, 0). The users are randomly
located at (Dk cos θk, Dk sin θk) with θk ∼ U(0, π), where
Dk ∼ U(100, 500) for k 6= K and DK = 1000.
In this setting, the proposed AAUC scheme still designs
v and w by solving P1 (i.e, uses two transmission phases,
forces |gHKv| = 0, and adopts the angular secrecy model). The
average secrecy rate versus the number of usersK ∈ {20, 100}
is shown in Fig. 5a. It can be seen that the performance of the
closed-form AAUC is not acceptable due to the small N/K .
On the other hand, the secrecy rates of SCO based AAUC and
BFOM based AAUC are significantly higher than that of direct
transmission when K = 100. This is because the proposed
AAUC exploits path diversity, and the helping users can relay
the information to the far-away user as shown in Fig. 5b.
However, the proposed AAUC schemes perform slightly worse
than traditional direct transmission when K = 20 due to K <
N (as shown in Fig. 5c). Fortunately, the proposed method
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can be executed in combination with direct transmission,
and the hybrid strategy can select between executing direct
transmission or AAUC. By switching to the other transmission
mode once the current mode is not satisfactory, the hybrid
transmission strategy can always achieve high security.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper studied the physical-layer security problem in
a massive MIMO multicasting system. Since the objective
function in this problem is not analytical, an angular secrecy
model, which matches the numerical integration very well, was
proposed. By adopting this model, secure beamforming design
was obtained via the SCO based AUCC algorithm. In the large-
scale settings, two fast algorithms were derived to tackle the
curse of high dimensionality. Simulation results showed that
the proposed SCO algorithm achieves higher security than
direct transmission. Furthermore, the proposed fast algorithms
significantly reduce the execution time compared to the SCO
while still achieving satisfactory performance.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPERTY (III)
To prove this property, we first notice that
S(R,w|σE)
=
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
{[
R
− 1
2
log2
1 +
∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2
σ2E
]+}dρ
≥
[
R− 1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
{
1
2
log2
1 +
∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2
σ2E
}dρ]+
≥
[
R− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
1
σ2EDK
×
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
[∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2] dρ
)]+
, (46)
where the first inequality is due to the convexity of [x]+ =
max(x, 0), and the second inequality is due to Jensen’s
inequality. On the other hand, we compute
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
[∣∣∣hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w∣∣∣2] dρ
=
1
DK
∫ DK
0
E{φk,δk}
[∣∣∣K−1∑
k=1
wk
√
̺0
(
dE,k(ρ)
d0
)−α
×
(√
KR
1 +KR
ejφk +
√
1
1 +KR
δk
) ∣∣∣2]dρ
=
1
DK
∫ DK
0
[
K−1∑
k=1
|wk|2 ̺0
(
dE,k(ρ)
d0
)−α]
dρ
=
K−1∑
k=1
|wk|2 ̺0
DK
∫ DK
0
[
(ρ cos θK −Dk cos θk)2
+ (ρ sin θK −Dk sin θk)2
]−α/2
dρ
= wHJw, (47)
where the first equality is obtained by putting hE(ρ, {φk, δk})
of (9) into |hHE (ρ, {φk, δk})w|2, and the second equality is
due to the independence between {φk} and {δk} together
with E[|δk|2] = 1, and the third equality is obtained from
the expression (8) of dE,k(ρ). Combining (46) and (47), the
proof is immediately completed.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To prove part (i), consider the following inequality(
z− z⋆
)HUHgkgHk U
σ2k
(
z− z⋆
)
≥ 0. (48)
This always holds due to UHgkg
H
k U  0. Then from (48)
we further have
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
≥2Re
[
(z⋆)HUHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k
]
− |g
H
k Uz
⋆|2
σ2k
, (49)
which leads to
1
2
log2
(
1 +
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
)
≥ 1
2
log2
(
1 + 2Re
[
(z⋆)HUHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k
]
− |g
H
k Uz
⋆|2
σ2k
)
.
(50)
On the other hand, since −1/2log2(·) is convex, it must be
greater than its first-order Taylor expansion, leading to
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λwHJw
σ2E
)
≥ − λw
HJw − λ (w⋆)H Jw⋆
2ln2
[
σ2E + λ (w
⋆)
H
Jw⋆
]
− 1
2
log2
(
1 +
λ (w⋆)
H
Jw⋆
σ2E
)
. (51)
By adding the equations (50) and (51), the inequality
Φ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆) ≤ Φk(z,w) is immediately proved. Finally,
due to hKh
H
K  0, it is clear that (w − w⋆)H hKh
H
K
σ2
K
(w −
w⋆) ≥ 0 and thus
|hHKw|2
σ2K
≥2Re
[
(w⋆)HhKh
H
Kw
σ2K
]
− |h
H
Kw
⋆|2
σ2K
. (52)
Combining (52) and (51) gives Υ˜(w|w⋆) ≤ Υ(w).
To prove part (ii), we put z = z⋆ and w = w⋆ into
Φ˜k in (21) and Υ˜ in (22). Then we immediately obtain
Φ˜k(z
⋆,w⋆|z⋆,w⋆) = Φk(z⋆,w⋆) and Υ˜(w⋆|w⋆) = Υ(w⋆).
To prove part (iii), we calculate the following derivatives:
∇zΦ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆) = U
Hgkg
H
k Uz
⋆
σ2k 2ln2(
1 + 2Re
[
(z⋆)HUHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k
]
− |g
H
k Uz
⋆|2
σ2k
)−1
, (53a)
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∇zΦk(z,w) =
(
1 +
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
)−1
UHgkg
H
k Uz
σ2k 2ln2
, (53b)
∇wΦ˜k(z,w|z⋆,w⋆) = − 1
2ln2
λJw
σ2E + λ (w
⋆)H Jw⋆
, (53c)
∇wΦk(z,w) = − 1
2ln2
λJw
σ2E + λw
HJw
, (53d)
∇wΥ˜(w|w⋆) =
(
1 + 2Re
[
(w⋆)HhKh
H
Kw
σ2K
]
− |h
H
Kw
⋆|2
σ2K
)−1
hKh
H
Kw
⋆
σ2k 2ln2
− 1
2ln2
λJw
σ2E + λ (w
⋆)
H
Jw⋆
, (53e)
∇wΥ(w) =
(
1 +
|hHKw|2
σ2K
)−1
hKh
H
Kw
σ2K 2ln2
− 1
2ln2
λJw
σ2E + λw
HJw
. (53f)
Then by putting z = z⋆ and w = w⋆ into (53a)–(53f), the
proof for part (iii) is completed.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To prove this proposition, we consider the problem P2
with fixed w = w∗. In such a case, the terms |hHKw∗|2 and
λ(w∗)HJw∗ in the objective function of P2 are constants,
which can be dropped without changing the solution of z.
Further removing 12 log2(·) in the objective function due to its
monotonicity, P2 with fixed w = w∗ is transformed into
max
z
min
k 6=K
|gHk Uz|2
σ2k
,
s.t. ||z||22 ≤ 2Pmax − ||w∗||22. (54)
To maximize zHUHgkg
H
k Uz for k 6= K , the optimal
z∗ ∈ span (UHg1, · · · ,UHgK−1). Therefore, without loss
of generality, we can set
z =
K−1∑
k=1
√
ξk e
jζk
UHgk
||UHgk||2 , (55)
with {ξk ≥ 0} being real nonnegative coefficients and {ζk}
being the corresponding phases.
When N → ∞, we have |gHj gk|2/||gk||22 → 0 for all
k 6= j. Adding to UUH → I as N → ∞, the quantity
|gHj UUHgk|/||UHgk||2 → 0 for all k 6= j. Therefore, by
putting z in (55) into problem (54), we obtain |gHk Uz|2 =
ξk||UHgk||22 in the objective function and ||z||22 =
∑K−1
k=1 ξk
in the constraint, meaning that the phases {ζk} would not
participate in the optimization. To this end, we can set ζk = 0
for all k in (55). Finally, putting (55) and ζk = 0 into (54),
problem (54) under N →∞ is equivalently written as
max
ξ
min
k 6=K
ξk||UHgk||22
σ2k
,
s.t.
K−1∑
k=1
ξk ≤ 2Pmax − ||w∗||22, (56)
where ξ = [ξ1, · · · , ξK−1]T ∈ R(K−1)×1+ . For the above
problem, the optimal ξ∗k must satisfy
ξ1||UHg1||22
σ21
= · · · = ξK−1||U
HgK−1||22
σ2K−1
. (57)
Otherwise, we can always increase ξj with j =
argmini6=K ξi||UHgi||22/σ2i by a small quantity ∆ξ and
decrease ξj with j = argmaxi6=K ξi||UHgi||22/σ2i by ∆ξ,
which would make
∑K−1
k=1 ξk unchanged but increase the
objective function of (56). Combining (57) and the constraint
of (56), the optimal ξ∗k to (56) is given by
ξ∗k =
(
2Pmax − ||w∗||22
)
σ2k(∑K−1
i=1 σ
2
i /||UHgi||22
)
||UHgk||22
. (58)
Putting ξk = ξ
∗
k into (55), the proposition is obtained.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
To solve P3, it can be seen that Ψ(w) inside the minimum
function is a monotonically decreasing function of ||w||22. Its
maximum value Ψmax > 0 is obtained at ||w||22 = 0, while its
minimum value Ψmin < 0 is obtained at ||w||22 = 2Pmax.
On the other hand, Υ(w) inside the minimum function is
a monotonically increasing function of ||w||22. Its maximum
value Υmax > 0 is obtained at ||w||22 = 2Pmax, while its
minimum value Υmin = 0 is obtained at ||w||22 = 0.
Based on the above observations, we now prove that the
optimal w∗ satisfies Ψ(w∗) = Υ(w∗) by contradiction. In
particular, assume that Ψ(w∗) < Υ(w∗). Then we must have
Υ(w∗) > 0 and thus ||w∗||22 > 0. As a result, we can always
decrease ||w||22 to increase Ψ(w) such that min[Ψ(w),Υ(w)]
is increased. This is in contradiction to w∗ being optimal. On
the other hand, if Ψ(w∗) > Υ(w∗), we must have Ψ(w∗) > 0
and thus ||w∗||22 < 2Pmax. Then we can always increase ||w||22
to increase Υ(w) such that min[Ψ(w),Υ(w)] is increased.
Again, contradiction is established.
Using Ψ(w∗) = Υ(w∗), we can add a constraint Ψ(w) =
Υ(w) to P3 without changing the problem, and P3 is equiv-
alently written as
max
w
Υ(w), s.t. Ψ(w) = Υ(w). (59)
By dropping the logarithm function in Υ and rearranging
Ψ(w) = Υ(w), the above problem is further simplified into
max
w
1 + |hHKw|2/σ2K
1 + λwHJw/σ2E
, s.t. wHΞw = 1, (60)
where the constraint is obtained from Ψ(w) = Υ(w) and Ξ
is given by (28). Using wHΞw = 1, the objective function of
(60) is equal to
wH(Ξ+ hKh
H
K/σ
2
K)w
/ [
wH(Ξ+ λJ/σ2E)w
]
.
Furthermore, by dropping the constraint wHΞw = 1, the
problem (60) is relaxed into
max
w
wH(Ξ + hKh
H
K/σ
2
K)w
wH(Ξ + λJ/σ2E)w
. (61)
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It can be seen that the objective function of (61) would not
change if we scale w by any positive factor. As a result, no
matter what value the optimal solution of w to (61) takes, we
can always scale it such that wHΞw = 1 is satisfied. This
means that the relaxed problem (61) is equivalent to (60), and
we can focus on solving (61) in the following.
To solve (61), a new variable q = (Ξ + λJ/σ2E)
1/2w is
introduced to replace w. Then (61) is transformed into
max
q
qH(Ξ+ λJ/σ2E)
−1/2(Ξ + hKh
H
K/σ
2
K)
× (Ξ+ λJ/σ2E)−1/2q
/
qHq, (62)
which is the standard eigenvalue problem, and the optimal
q∗ is the dominant eigenvector of (Ξ + λJ/σ2E)
−1/2(Ξ +
hKh
H
K/σ
2
K)(Ξ + λJ/σ
2
E)
−1/2. Putting q = q∗ into q =
(Ξ + λJ/σ2E)
1/2w and scaling w such that wHΞw = 1,
the equation (27) is obtained. This completes the proof.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
To prove this proposition, we first compute
||∇xΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇xΘ[n] (x′,γ) ||2
=
2γK ||hK ||22
σ2K
||x− x′||2 ≤ 2||hK ||
2
2
σ2K
||x− x′||2. (63)
It can be seen from (63) and (39) that L̂ satisfies (38a). Next,
we will prove that L̂ satisfies (38b). In particular, based on
the gradient in (37a), we have
||∇xΘ[n] (x,γ)−∇xΘ[n] (x,γ′) ||2
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣K−1∑
k=1
(γk − γ′k)r[n]k − (γK − γ′K)
2||hK ||22x
σ2K
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤
K−1∑
k=1
|γk − γ′k| ||r[n]k ||2 + |γK − γ′K |
2||hK ||22||x||2
σ2K
≤
K−1∑
k=1
|γk − γ′k| ||r[n]k ||2 + |γK − γ′K |
2
√
2Pmax||hK ||22
σ2K
≤ L̂
K∑
k=1
|γk − γ′k| = L̂||γ − γ′||1, (64)
where the first inequality is due to ||a+b|| ≤ ||a||+ ||b||, the
second inequality is due to x ∈ A, and the last inequality is
due to ||r[n]k ||2 ≤ L̂ and 2
√
2Pmax||hK ||22/σ2K ≤ L̂.
Finally, it is clear that (38c) holds since ||∇γΘ[n] (x,γ) −
∇γΘ[n] (x,γ′) ||∞ = 0. Therefore, we only need to show that
L̂ satisfies (38d). To this end, based on the gradient in (37b),
the left hand side of (38d) is equal to
||∇γΘ[n] (x,γ) −∇γΘ[n] (x′,γ) ||∞
= max
[∣∣∣(r[n]1 )T (x− x′)∣∣∣, · · · , ∣∣∣(r[n]K−1)T (x− x′)∣∣∣,
||hK ||22
σ2K
∣∣∣||x||22 − ||x′||22∣∣∣
]
≤ max
[
||r[n]1 ||2 ||x− x′||2, · · · , ||r[n]K−1||2 ||x− x′||2,
||hK ||22
σ2K
∣∣∣||x||22 − ||x′||22∣∣∣
]
, (65)
where the inequality is due to |aTb| ≤ ||a||2||b||2. Moreover,
||hK ||22
σ2K
∣∣∣||x||22 − ||x′||22∣∣∣
=
||hK ||22
σ2K
(||x||2 + ||x′||2)
∣∣∣||x||2 − ||x′||2∣∣∣
≤ ||hK ||
2
2
σ2K
× 2
√
2Pmax||x− x′||2, (66)
where the inequality is due to x,x′ ∈ A and
∣∣∣||a|| − ||b||∣∣∣ ≤
||a− b||. By putting (66) into (65), the proof is completed.
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